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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [EAID](#) [PREL](#) [AF](#) [TU](#)  
SUBJECT: WARDAK GOVERNOR FADAI COMPLAINS TO IDLG ABOUT  
TURKISH PRT

REF: KABUL 2814

Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Coordinator Scott Kilner  
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

11. (C) Summary: During a mid-November conversation with Task Force Spartan leadership, Wardak Governor Fadai said that he has complained in a number of written reports to GIROA,s Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) that Turkish PRT projects are &poor8 and that the PRT does not exchange information with GIROA or the local people. The most recent memo, dated August 10 and entitled &Complaints Against Turkish PRT and Their Problems,8 recommends that if the Turks establish a new PRT elsewhere, they should consolidate their efforts there so that the US can establish a PRT in Wardak. Fadai,s report represents a reasonably accurate account of the Turkish PRT,s shortcomings, yet TF Spartan believes that, weaknesses notwithstanding, the Turkish PRT,s basic police training program is effective and highly regarded by Coalition, ANP and other GIROA officials. Fadai is likely motivated in part by the fact that a US PRT would bring additional resources to Wardak above and beyond what the Turks could provide even if they were fully functional. Regardless, the Turkish PRT,s inability to carry out other development programs throughout the province has been an ongoing source of frustration and difficulty. End Summary.

12. (C) The Turkish PRT has been working in Wardak since 2006 to promote and develop education, health, agricultural, women,s rights and police training, among other initiatives. The PRT,s location is ideal since it is positioned directly across the street from the provincial council and governor's office, making it accessible both physically and socially. It is not located on the local Coalition military base, but within a short walking distance. Furthermore, as citizens of the only predominantly Muslim country in NATO, the PRT staff has an opportunity to establish a particular rapport with the Afghan population. It is questionable, however, whether the Turks have been able to capitalize on this common affinity.

13. (C) Since becoming provincial governor in May 2008, Mohammad Haleem Fadai has provided reports to the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) on the PRT,s progress and impact throughout Wardak. He shared his fifth report, dated 10 August 2009, with Task Force Spartan commanders and civilian advisors in mid-November. The report is critical, of TIKa (the Turkish equivalent of USAID), the quality and reach of projects, and the difficulties with coordination.

14. (C) The four-page memo states that the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs approved 56 Wardak PRT projects for 2009, but only five have been started. Governor Fadai grades the quality and magnitude of their projects as &poor.8 (NOTE: The report does not mention any specific project by name. END NOTE) He also complains about a lack of transparency and the limited amount of information exchanged regarding PRT

activities.

15. (C) The fact that TIKA,s activities are primarily run out of Kabul is another source of friction with the governor, which further frustrates coordination. Moreover, the PRT overall is controlled from Kabul. (Comment: If the Turkish Ambassador or other officials feel slighted by GIROA or the United States, or wish to express displeasure or disagreement, even if the problem is not associated with PRT activities, the impact is felt directly on the ground in Wardak. Meetings are cancelled, decisions are not made, and protocol toward local ISAF entities is ignored. END COMMENT)

16. (C) The memo concludes with the observation that if the Turks establish a PRT in Farah province (Note: In fact, the Turks are focused on a new PRT in Jowzjan Province. End Note), they would not have enough capacity to take on the added responsibility. Governor Fadaï believes that establishing a second Turkish PRT would reduce their already scant attention to Wardak. He requests that a US PRT replace the Turks in Wardak, so that the Turks can focus their activities up north.

17. (C) Although not mentioned in the governor,s report, the Turks have been successful with their police development program. Since May, they have provided "police basic training" to approximately one hundred ANP throughout Wardak. (NOTE: The Turks do not call it &FDD ) Focused District Development<sup>8</sup> since that is a &CSTC-A initiative.<sup>8</sup>

However, the Turkish program is identified by ISAF and CSTC-A as compliant with national standards. END NOTE) The course is provided in order to "re-blue" existing police and to help new police who have not gone through other forms of training.

It lasts approximately eight weeks on the PRT compound, but has been known to go longer if the class needs additional

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instruction. The Turks focus on quality development - not just churning out graduates.

18. (C) The security situation in Wardak has posed a challenge for the Turkish PRT. Their ability to travel outside of the provincial capital, Mayden Sharh, has been limited. While the Turks have an approximately 70-man security element to support their civilian development experts, the PRT has had to delay or stop implementation of projects in many areas.

(NOTE: Approximately 20 of the 70 security officials assist with convoy security. The others are assigned to protect the PRT. END NOTE) Additional security assistance has been offered to the PRT by Task Force Spartan, but the Turks have declined. (NOTE: The Czech PRT in Logar, which is also in Task Force Spartan,s area of operations, has also been offered security assistance to complement the Czech military contingent assigned to help their civilian experts. They have accepted, and the Czechs now carry out projects throughout the entire province. END NOTE)

Comment

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19. (C) Governor Fadaï,s report on the Turkish PRT is clear and direct. His critique is hard, but reasonably accurate, based upon our current understanding of Turkish activities. Turkish development projects are limited. While their police training program provides true value-added to the province, it may not make up for the lack of development programs a PRT should provide for a province as important as Wardak.

Fadaï,s recommendation that the Turks be replaced by a US PRT is likely a calculated move on the governor,s part to get additional money and resources to Wardak. Earlier this year, Governor Fadaï joked to Task Force Spartan leadership that &All provincial governors know that you win the lottery based upon which country runs your PRT. If you get Lithuania or Turkey, you lose. But if you get a US PRT, you win.<sup>8</sup>

This cable was drafted by Task Force Spartan State Rep and cleared by the TF Commander.

Mussomeli